In India’s northeastern state of Manipur, a violent ethnic conflict between the Meitei and Kuki communities has now stretched into its third year. Despite changes in government and repeated calls for peace, displacement remains widespread and tensions continue to simmer.
The crisis that engulfed the northeastern Indian state of Manipur on 3 May 2023 has now completed three years, with no solution in sight. What began as a small incident at the villages of Kangvai and Torbung soon escalated into a wider ethnic conflict between the Meitei community, largely based in the valley, and the Kuki community, who predominantly inhabit the surrounding hill districts. It spread to Churachandpur, Moreh near the India–Myanmar border, and Kangpokpi, with the targeting of Meitei settlements in these areas, forcing people to flee to safer places.
Retaliation began in the valley areas, and the violence has continued since. The ethnic cleansing of the two warring communities now appears complete. Hundreds have lost their lives, more than 60,000 have been displaced, and many are still classified as missing. Despite efforts to bring normalcy, the effort seems too little, with not much impact, to be fair. Some have already moved back to their original places, but most still continue to reside in relief camps and temporary shelters, rather than the violence being contained.
This crisis has spread, engulfing other communities. Earlier, it affected the Liangmai and Inpui Naga—tribal groups belonging to the wider Naga community—in Kangpokpi district, but now the Tangkhul Naga, another major Naga tribe in Ukhrul district, have also been affected. There is a strong concern that it can encompass other communities and that the cycle of violence will escalate.
There have been changes in the state government. The Biren government resigned in February 2025, and President’s Rule was imposed for one year. A new government is now in place, but there is hardly any change in the ground situation. Rather, the tension seems to have spread. The government in the state is not that relevant, as the strings are controlled by the Centre, or federal government. The most unfortunate part is that the Indian Army, which has an excellent reputation, has had its dignity questioned, with women checking the Aadhaar cards—India’s national identity documents—of personnel.
Despite the presence of one of the world’s largest armies, supported by a large number of central police personnel, it has hardly made a dent in the situation. A small incident that should have been controlled, even with the use of force, has, because of the inaction of the government, spread like wildfire.
Now engulfing the entire state, while the government has the legal right to use force, violence is being used by civilians with impunity, as nothing much has been done to penalise the perpetrators. The present government’s attempts to bridge the gap between the communities have not been reciprocated.
Rather, it seems to have hardened the stand of the Kuki. It takes two hands to clap, and the inability to act against those opposed to efforts towards normalcy is a major impediment to the process of restoring it. The demand for a separate administration continues unabated, though it seems that many within that community feel the need for rapprochement. The armed militants, both under Suspension of Operations (SoO)—a ceasefire pact with the government—and non-SoO groups, have continued.
SoO and non-SoO groups continue to make these demands, and they insist on protesting the so-called buffer zones, which have been clarified by both the Centre and the state as not existing, with these areas classified only as vulnerable or sensitive. Despite the conditions of the agreement that no fresh recruitment shall be made, these groups continue to recruit.
As many who have died in the crisis are below 30 years of age, it indicates that new recruitment has taken place. Many have been trained in Myanmar by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and, after returning, appear ready for further conflict.
The situation has led to more demands, such as the National Register of Citizens (NRC) being conducted before the census, and there is a possibility of the census being boycotted by various communities. There are also reports of many new villages that have sprung up near the Indo–Myanmar border, with little or no reporting to the state government by the agency tasked with guarding the border. The control of poppy plantation is limited, and it has become a major source of livelihood for many, though efforts are ongoing in Naga-inhabited areas with some success.
But in Kuki-dominated areas, the effort is muted. Meitei IDPs (internally displaced persons) are demanding to return to their original places, while similar demands are not seen among the Kuki, though privately many are keen to return. This indicates that those with arms may be suppressing them into silence. Many of the villages that were earlier vacated can easily be resettled, and some have quietly done so. However, many farmlands near the foothills still cannot be accessed, affecting the economy of the state and its people.
Due to the prolonged crisis, the trust deficit has increased not only between communities but also within communities, and with the government. Efforts to bring in development are seen more as vote-catching exercises, and any initiative of the government is viewed with suspicion. The Chief Minister’s visit to Jiribam, Senapati and Ukhrul by road was an effort to build understanding, but it led to attacks on oil tankers and ambushes along the routes.
This indicates that any initiative towards normalcy may be spurned for larger objectives. The inability of the state government to govern, especially in the hills, has been starkly exposed, and efforts to restore governance are urgently needed. The delay in conducting elections to Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), which represent grassroots democracy, reflects poorly on priorities, with power being consolidated rather than delegated.
There has been talk of coordinated operations after elections in several states and one Union Territory, with responsibility being given to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), including the deployment of COBRA battalions. The objective is to bring insurgency in the Northeast, especially Manipur, under control by 2029. However, Maoist insurgents in central India and insurgents in the Northeast are very different, not only in ideology but also in capability.
In preparation, provisions under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and advisories for media and online platforms have been issued. These may face legal challenges. The media will be under pressure, and there have already been instances where issues were not reported due to pressure from both state and non-state actors. Violence will only beget violence.
While some groups have surrendered looted weapons and are not committing further acts of violence, on the other side, violence continues unabated, despite propaganda to the contrary. Some places have become centres of drug addiction, with many youth falling victim due to frustration and lack of employment. The issue of drug addiction is significant, but efforts remain limited. In a few years, parts of Manipur risk becoming severely affected.
The only way forward is talks, and any community not amenable to talks needs to be persuaded or pressured. This disinterest may be due to a trust deficit, which must be overcome through confidence-building measures. Those who refuse talks for political reasons may need to be brought to the negotiating table, even through stronger measures.
It is here that the forces deployed in the state must be given clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or defined operational guidelines, and not be left entirely to adjust to local situations. The tendency of forces not to intervene when violence occurs emboldens perpetrators. The first step must be to act firmly against those committing violence. The objectives of deployment must be clearly defined, and forces must act accordingly.
The inability of the government to expand governance structures and the skewed allocation of portfolios continues to be a burden. The tendency to block roads at the drop of a hat, especially highways, must be dealt with firmly. The inability to do so over the last three years reflects poorly on governance.
One hopes that changes within the Ministry of Home Affairs do not affect the ongoing talks. The situation in Ukhrul could escalate and spread to other districts, and casualties could be high due to the limited presence of security forces in the hills. There has been consolidation of forces among communities, which could lead to a wider conflict. The situation is very different from that of 1992–1997.
The inquiry commission set up by the Supreme Court has not progressed, nor have investigations into the thousands of FIRs lodged. While there may be valid reasons for the delay, it has led to further distrust.
RK Nimai is a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer and a widely respected commentator and public speaker on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own
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