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Air India AI171: Fuel cut off just 3 seconds after takeoff — Why?

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An In-Depth Look at the Preliminary Report and the Questions It Raises

This article is based on my review of the preliminary report released by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of India on the accident involving Air India flight AI171. I would encourage everyone to read this report.

As someone of Indian heritage living in Australia—and who travels frequently across the globe—the tragedy of Air India flight AI171 struck close. It compelled me to look beyond the headlines, to explore how such a modern jetliner could fall from the sky moments after takeoff, and what it reveals about the fragile balance between human decision-making and machine safeguards.

My bond with aviation runs deep. My very first international flight, as a four-year-old migrating to Australia in 1994, was on Air India—from Chennai to Singapore, bound ultimately for Melbourne. Since then, air travel has become a defining thread in my life. Today, as a Qantas Platinum frequent flyer who has flown extensively and is deeply passionate about aviation, I believe keeping the trust of passengers—and ensuring their safety—is of paramount importance for airlines, manufacturers, and regulators alike.

It is from this vantage—part emotional, part analytical—that I’ve delved into the preliminary findings on AI171. Not just to understand this single tragedy, but to reflect on what it means for all of us who step aboard, counting on human judgment and engineering excellence to deliver us safely to our destinations.

Fuel cut off just three seconds after takeoff

The preliminary report, released on 11 July 2025 by India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), lays out the final moments of AI171 in precise, unsettling detail.

On 12 June 2025, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (registration VT-ANB) operated by Air India took off from Ahmedabad bound for London Gatwick. It was a heavy flight on a hot afternoon, carrying 230 passengers, 12 crew and fuel for a long-haul journey.

  • At 08:07:37 UTC, the aircraft began its takeoff roll on Runway 23.
  • By 08:08:39 UTC, it had rotated and lifted off, climbing through 153 knots (V1—takeoff decision speed) and 155 knots (Vr—rotation speed). Then, just three seconds later, at
  • 08:08:42 UTC, the flight data shows something extraordinary:

“The Engine 1 and Engine 2 Fuel Control Switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF one after another with a time gap of 01 sec.”
— (AAIB Preliminary Report, July 2025)

This manual movement cut off fuel to both engines, causing the N2 core speeds (the high-pressure core rotations) to decay almost immediately. Thrust vanished. The aircraft began to lose altitude within seconds.

RAT deployed; left engine began recovering, but time ran out

As both engines wound down, the Boeing 787’s sophisticated emergency systems responded. The Ram Air Turbine (RAT), a small propeller-like device under the fuselage, deployed automatically to provide emergency hydraulic and electrical power.

The lone survivor of AI171, Viswashkumar Ramesh, a British national of Indian origin seated in 11A near an emergency exit, described hearing a loud noise shortly after take-off—consistent with the RAT’s sudden deployment under high airflow, an event known to be both noisy and physically startling.

Examining the detailed sequence from the report and flight data:

  • At 08:08:42 UTC, the left engine’s Fuel Control Switch was moved to CUTOFF.
  • One second later (08:08:43), the right engine was also cut off.
  • Approximately 10 seconds later (08:08:52), the left engine switch was returned to RUN, prompting its FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) to begin an automatic relight attempt.
  • The right engine followed only at 08:08:56, about 13 seconds after it was initially shut off, lagging the left by a crucial few seconds.

This slight difference mattered greatly. The left engine, having been restored to RUN first, retained higher core speeds (N2) and began to spool up more readily. The right engine, meanwhile, had decayed further and faced a harder relight—struggling with repeated ignition attempts that failed to stabilise. This is a well-documented phenomenon in turbine engines, especially at low airspeeds and high weights, where even a few seconds longer at low RPM can make the difference between a successful restart and a “hung” or slow acceleration.

Meanwhile, the RAT’s deployment—as confirmed in the report—would have been accompanied by the typical reconfigurations of a Boeing 787’s electrical and hydraulic systems. Although the report doesn’t detail specific cockpit alerts, standard aircraft design means the crew would have faced advisories like RAT deployment status, shifting power source messages, and “ENG FAIL” indications. This likely compounded their situational workload at an already critical moment.

At this stage of the investigation, the report does not specify which pilot moved the switches back to RUN, nor who transmitted the mayday call at 08:09:05 UTC. With the landing gear still down—adding significant drag—minimal altitude remaining, and asymmetric power restoration, the aircraft simply ran out of time to recover.

Just seconds later, it impacted a medical college hostel building less than a nautical mile from the runway, tragically claiming 241 of the 242 lives on board, along with 19 individuals on the ground.

The FAA in December 2018 issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB NM-18-33) noting that on some Boeing models—including the 787—Fuel Control Switches were found installed with their locking feature disengaged

Mechanical fault or human action?

At this early stage, the AAIB report does not ascribe a final cause. However, the evidence points firmly to two broad investigative avenues.

1) Could this have been a mechanical or electronic fault?

Intriguingly, the FAA in December 2018 issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB NM-18-33) noting that on some Boeing models—including the 787—Fuel Control Switches were found installed with their locking feature disengaged.

Under normal circumstances, these switches have a detent mechanism, requiring pilots to physically lift them over a mechanical stop (detent) before pulling down from RUN to CUTOFF. This makes inadvertent movement virtually impossible. If the locking feature was disengaged, however, the switch could be moved between RUN and CUTOFF without lifting, exposing it to the risk of unintended operation from vibration, aircraft angle, or even minor bumps.

There is currently no direct evidence that AI171’s switches had this defect, but it cannot yet be conclusively ruled out. Combined with the aircraft’s steep nose-up attitude on takeoff, it is at least mechanically possible that such unlocked switches could have been nudged to CUTOFF—though the fact they moved in immediate sequence (one second apart), not simultaneously, makes a pure mechanical “tilt back” failure seem slightly less likely.

Notably, the FAA’s SAIB was only an advisory bulletin, not an Airworthiness Directive (AD). This meant there was no global mandate to inspect or retrofit the locking features, and Air India confirmed it did not perform these inspections since they were not required. It highlights a deeper question for the industry: should airlines take even advisory bulletins more seriously as part of fostering a truly proactive safety culture?

It’s also a dimension that Boeing, as the manufacturer, will be watching with exceptional care. With a market capitalisation near $170 billion USD and annual revenues exceeding $66 billion, the stakes are enormous. The company is still rebuilding its reputation after the devastating 737 MAX crisis, which exposed serious gaps in engineering oversight and corporate transparency. Its stock has climbed roughly 5% over the past month, a fragile recovery that could be rattled by any new questions over design flaws.

And the sheer scale of the 787 program underscores why. Since entering service in 2011, the Dreamliner has:

  • Carried over 1 billion passengers across nearly 5 million flights, logging 30+ million flight hours.
  • Become the bestselling passenger widebody ever, with 2,000+ orders from 89 customers, operating to 85+ countries and 520+ airports.
  • Enabled 425+ new nonstop routes and moves around 14.5 million people a month—with each aircraft typically flying 12+ hours a day.

A systemic defect would have sweeping global repercussions, far beyond this single tragic accident. Which is precisely why both Boeing and regulators will continue to probe every possible mechanical angle exhaustively.

All of which underscores why, even as we weigh these mechanical hypotheticals, the investigation must still look elsewhere—because the preliminary report effectively rules out another scenario airlines fear most: a catastrophic dual engine failure.

Dual engine failure, contamination or bird strike effectively ruled out

Early speculation centred on a rare catastrophic dual engine failure. But the preliminary report makes clear this was not the cause. There was no evidence of fuel contamination, mechanical defects, bird ingestion, or adverse weather. The engines were operating normally right up until both Fuel Control Switches were moved to CUTOFF—with no prior EICAS warnings or anomalies.

If this had been a true dual engine failure, we would expect to see abrupt engine alerts, immediate checklist callouts, and attempts to windmill restart by cycling the switches. Yet the flight data shows none of this. The RAT only deployed after both engines lost power due to fuel starvation—a direct consequence of manual shutoff.

And while history offers extraordinary examples like US Airways Flight 1549, where pilots safely ditched an Airbus A320 on the Hudson River after a dual bird strike at 2,800 feet, AI171 was still in its take-off climb—heavy, gear down, with minimal altitude and virtually no margin to convert height into time. In such a scenario, options are brutally limited.

This drives home a critical point:

Even though AI171 was not brought down by a conventional dual engine failure, the incident starkly reveals how catastrophic a total loss of thrust is in the take-off phase—whether from a mechanical fault or, as here, a manual fuel cut-off. It highlights why design, procedures, and cockpit culture must all work to prevent any situation that could simultaneously starve both engines of power at the most vulnerable stage of flight.

2) Was it inadvertent or deliberate human action?

The more probable focus is human action—though whether by gross cockpit error, confusion under startle, or deliberate malicious intent is precisely what investigators must determine next.

According to the report, the captain, aged 56, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) on this flight and the first officer, aged 32, was the Pilot Flying (PF). While the report does not explicitly state cockpit seating positions, by standard global airline operating practice the captain would have been seated on the left and the first officer on the right.

The cockpit voice recorder captured a brief, tense exchange:

“One of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.”
— (AAIB Preliminary Report, July 2025)

There were no recorded engine warnings or checklist procedures underway that would justify moving the Fuel Control Switches. Under normal operations, these switches are only moved in flight to shut down an engine for fire or severe damage, or to cycle them during an extremely rare dual engine restart at cruise—none of which applied here.

While procedures vary slightly across airlines, it is generally the Pilot Monitoring who operates engine controls during taxi, start and early flight phases. In this case, with the First Officer flying the aircraft on take-off, it’s improbable he would have had hands free to reach for the Fuel Control Switches—reinforcing speculation that these were moved by the Pilot Monitoring.

Captain Mohan Ranganathan, a veteran pilot with over 20,000 hours and a former member of India’s Safety Advisory Committee, also raised concerns in an NDTV interview that the preliminary report did not reveal the full cockpit dialogue or attribute specific lines to either pilot, calling these details “vague” and urging more clarity.

While the AAIB’s preliminary findings do confirm that both pilots were medically certified and had passed their annual checks, Ranganathan highlighted that this alone may not be enough. “Several pilots in Air India are reporting he (the Captain) has a medical condition and he was also on medical leave for some time (before flying AI171),” he said—an assertion still unverified by official sources and likely to be explored in the final investigation.

It underscores why thorough reviews of a pilot’s psychological and behavioural health—not just days before a crash, but over preceding months—can be critical. The final report may well provide this clarity, ensuring all possible factors, from operational stress to underlying health, are properly examined.

The unsettling possibility of a deliberate pilot-induced crash or mass suicide, while extremely rare, is not without precedent. Tragedies such as Germanwings 9525, SilkAir 185, EgyptAir 990 and likely MH370 all underscore how rogue actions can have the most catastrophic of consequences—even in the world’s most advanced flying machines.

The future of pilot mental health: insights from Dr. Charlie Curreri

Whether this tragedy stemmed from a catastrophic lapse, confusion under startle, or something even darker, it inevitably shines a light on a deeper industry challenge: the mental health of those we trust at the controls.

Many pilots today face relentless rosters, long-haul fatigue, personal strain, and a cultural stigma that can make admitting vulnerability feel like risking their career. Without robust, industry-wide frameworks that encourage disclosure and provide genuine support, the risk of psychological distress quietly building remains a critical vulnerability.

In researching this piece, I connected with Dr. Charlie Curreri, whose background is as extraordinary as it is relevant: a retired American Airlines A320 captain with over 23 years at the airline; a former F-16 combat pilot with 3,000 hours during Desert Storm; and today a licensed professional counsellor (CEAP, SAP) with advanced degrees in human relations, counselling and a doctorate in industrial and organisational psychology. Curreri also created one of aviation’s leading peer support programs, Project Wingman, and recently co-chaired the FAA’s 2024 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) on Pilot Mental Health and runs the Centre for Aviation Mental Health in Texas, USA.

“There is a strong movement in the aviation industry and regulators focusing on pilot mental health,” he told me. “The ARC highlighted the need for programs that improve mental health literacy and help reduce stigma.”

Curreri argues this must go far beyond token checks. It means integrating mental health literacy into new hire classes, recurrent training, leadership modules, and discreet, stigma-free avenues to seek help. Some airlines are already experimenting with anonymous peer programs, on-site mental health practitioners and resources from badge QR codes to personal testimony videos.

The biggest hurdle? A culture where pilots still fear speaking up. A 2022 study showed over 55% of U.S. pilots would not disclose mental health concerns to the FAA, worried it could ground their careers. As Curreri underscores, the next evolution of safety must be as much about supporting human wellbeing as it is about mechanical redundancy.

It’s precisely this kind of systemic, proactive shift that can catch issues long before they ever enter a cockpit.

How Air India’s leadership can turn this adversity into strength

This tragedy undeniably comes at a fragile time for Air India. Under the stewardship of the Tata Group—the airline’s original founders—Air India is executing the most ambitious transformation in its history. With the largest aircraft order ever placed, bold plans to refresh cabins, and a clear goal to reclaim international prestige, the timing of AI171 could hardly have been worse.

Yet it’s precisely in moments like these that leadership can shape an airline’s legacy. By confronting hard questions transparently, accelerating investments in safety, and doubling down on a culture that truly prioritises passenger and crew wellbeing, Air India has the chance not just to recover—but to build a reputation for remarkable resilience.

Frequent flyer and Flighthacks founder Immanuel Debeer (@flighthacks) flew on Air India’s new A350 just weeks after the crash. He described it as “very much business as usual, with friendly crew, excellent food and the A350 cabin (although intended for Aeroflot) is fantastic.” Observing the broader shift underway, he added: “Air India has been on a huge campaign to change its image, product, and service standards. This year, the airline is retrofitting its Boeing 787 fleet with new cabins and a fresh coat of paint. They started in June so we can expect to see the results in the not-so-distant future.”

This kind of consistency in service matters. But deeper, lasting trust will come from how the airline tackles uncomfortable realities. Debeer also acknowledges that the path to rebuilding confidence won’t be immediate: “An incident like this is horrific and it’s normal (initially) for people to be hesitant to fly with the carrier.”

Erwin Nath (@thetravellerwin), another travel expert based in India, shares this concern: “As an Indian and frequent flyer of Air India, the AI171 tragedy is deeply unsettling. The fact that both manual fuel cutoff switches disengaged within a second raises serious questions. Was it human error or technical failure? That needs transparent answers.”

Yet even while the investigation continues, Nath’s optimism endures. “I believe the airline can recover; it has shown resilience, from flying repatriation missions during COVID-19 to evacuating Indians from war zones. With Tata’s transformation and record-breaking order of 470 new aircraft, trust can be rebuilt one flight at a time.”

If handled well, this could ultimately mark a new chapter—one defined by a renewed focus on safety, crew wellbeing and the passenger experience. “Confidence isn’t rebuilt overnight,” Nath says. “But with clear intent, consistent transparency, and a deep-rooted commitment to safety and service, trust can absolutely be earned back.”

In many ways, this tragic incident may yet become a pivotal moment—not just for Air India’s brand, but for what it symbolises: a new era in Indian aviation that learns, adapts, and emerges stronger. As Air India CEO Campbell Wilson has often emphasised, true transformation isn’t simply measured by aircraft orders or new cabins—it’s measured by the trust you rebuild, passenger by passenger.

In the aftermath of AI171, how Air India chooses to lead will determine whether this tragedy becomes merely a scar, or the catalyst for its proudest resurgence yet.

What comes next for safety and design?

This tragedy could spark far-reaching discussions—not only about switches and software, but about the human factors at the heart of aviation safety. It’s a reminder that even the most sophisticated machines ultimately rely on people under pressure.

The industry is already debating how to go further: normalising mental health support, fostering cultures where speaking up is safe, and designing systems that actively catch human slips before they escalate into catastrophe.

Different manufacturers balance this human–machine interface differently. Boeing’s longstanding philosophy on aircraft like the 787 puts ultimate control in the pilots’ hands, relying on mechanical safeguards such as lift-over detents rather than software locks to prevent inadvertent shutdowns. This is not without context: after the tragedies involving the 737 MAX—where the MCAS system overrode pilot inputs with catastrophic results—Boeing’s caution around automation that could unilaterally override human command is understandable.

By contrast, Embraer has implemented logic on some jets that blocks engine shutdown unless certain parameters, like thrust at idle, are met—quietly sanity-checking pilot commands. Each approach carries trade-offs: Boeing’s maximises authority for pilots to react instantly to genuine emergencies, while Embraer’s reduces the risk of a mistaken or stress-induced command. In an era of booming global travel, intense rosters, and pilot shortages, it’s a question the industry can’t ignore: whether tomorrow’s systems should do more to backstop human fallibility, even if rare.

Alongside these debates, there’s growing interest in how AI1,2,3 might serve as a silent second-check on pilot inputs, how dual-consent safeguards could prevent accidental dual engine shutdowns, how live telemetry might flag improbable actions in real time, and how structured psychological check-ins could be normalised without stigma.

These ideas don’t necessarily require costly re-certifications, but they could add critical new layers of defence. In aviation, as in life, real progress starts by asking the hard questions—even the uncomfortable ones. That’s exactly what the comparison that follows sets out to explore, contrasting today’s practices against future safeguards that could make flying even more resilient.

Question / Concept Current practice Conceptual future
Dual-crew consent before both Fuel Control Switches move to CUTOFF? No such system today. Switches use mechanical lift-over detents and rely on SOPs and cockpit discipline. Could incorporate an EICAS logic check or dual-crew electronic confirmation outside approved checklists—preventing accidental or rogue dual shutdowns.
Sensors + AI to detect external threats (bird strikes, ingestion, fire) and auto-manage engines? FADEC monitors internal engine health; bird strikes or external fires rely on pilot detection and checklists. Multi-sensor systems paired with AI could detect bird ingestion, airflow disruption or early thermal signatures, instantly alerting pilots via EICAS. Initially as enhanced advisories, with possible future evolution to assist power modulation—though this would need new certifications and retraining.
AI co-pilots or silent plausibility monitoring? Today’s autopilot and flight directors fly set paths but don’t question human manual inputs—there’s no system that flags implausible pilot commands. AI could continuously cross-check switch inputs against aircraft state and flight phase, instantly flagging anomalies like cutting both engines during climb.
Live cockpit telemetry to airline ops / regulator oversight? Flight data is typically analysed post-flight (FDR downloads); live data feeds mainly support maintenance diagnostics. Real-time streaming of cockpit control inputs to secure airline or regulator AIs could detect improbable or rogue actions immediately—but raises privacy and pilot autonomy concerns.
Structured mental health check-ins? Mostly tied to periodic Class 1 medicals, heavily reliant on self-disclosure; stigma often inhibits open discussion. Normalised recurrent psychological check-ins, combined with peer support networks, could catch issues early and reduce escalation risks.
Better fatigue and stress mitigation? Airlines enforce Flight Time Limitations (FTL) and rest, but broader psychological stress is not systematically tracked. Industry-wide, non-punitive frameworks could proactively address fatigue, family pressures and burnout—with tools beyond just hours limitations.
Human override in future highly autonomous systems? Modern cockpits prioritize pilot override of automation, but growing autonomy prompts concern over losing final command. Future cockpits might employ secure multi-channel overrides, balancing pilot control with ground oversight to safeguard against automation errors, deliberate misuse, and even potential cyber incursions.

 

Air India AI171 crashed because fuel was cut off to both engines during climb—the most critical and unforgiving phase of flight. This led to immediate fuel starvation and a loss of thrust, with neither the altitude nor the time needed to recover.

The bottom line—for now

Air India AI171 crashed because fuel was cut off to both engines during climb—the most critical and unforgiving phase of flight. This led to immediate fuel starvation and a loss of thrust, with neither the altitude nor the time needed to recover.

The Boeing 787 simply doesn’t have automation that can move the Fuel Control Switches. The preliminary report found no mechanical fault forcing them either. That means the switches were almost certainly moved by human hands.

What remains is the crucial question of why. Was it a disastrous slip? A startled overreaction? A disengaged locking feature as warned by the FAA’s 2018 bulletin? Or something more deliberate? That is precisely what the final investigation must now determine.

What remains indisputable is that despite aviation’s remarkable engineering, human actions—and human fallibility—remain the ultimate gatekeepers of safety.

The forthcoming final report will be critical, not only to reconstruct the exact chain of decisions and failures, but to ensure that every possible lesson is absorbed and acted upon. And, above all, to provide closure for the families of all those who lost their lives.

A forward-looking reflection.

Problem solving in aviation—as in life—begins by asking hard questions, even when they’re uncomfortable. This tragedy compels us not just to seek answers for AI171, but to examine the delicate balance between human resilience, machine safeguards, and the organisational cultures that keep flying safe. That is precisely what this analysis aims to spark: an open, informed conversation that helps aviation continue to evolve.

As frequent flyer Immanuel Debeer aptly put it: “Now that we know the likely cause isn’t related to the equipment, people can hopefully regain confidence as flying is still one of the safest transport methods out there. That said, we’ll need to wait for the final report to draw conclusions.”

It is often in moments of adversity that we learn the most—and the true measure lies in how we use those lessons. I look forward to the final report, to a stronger global aviation industry, and to seeing Air India rebound from this tragedy with renewed purpose.


Nav Ganesh (@navman26) is an Australian entrepreneur and passionate traveller of Indian heritage. A Qantas Platinum frequent flyer with a global outlook, he explores how human judgement, technology, and culture converge—in aviation, business, and beyond. His writing aims to spark open conversations on the choices and systems that shape our lives.


1 The transformative impact of AI in Aviation
2 The evolution of AI on the commercial flight deck
3 Artificial Intelligence in Aviation safety: systematic review and biometric analysis


 

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS USED
Term Definition & Context
Fuel Control Switch (FCS) A guarded lever on the cockpit pedestal that starts or cuts off fuel to an engine. On AI171, these were moved to CUTOFF just after takeoff, cutting fuel supply.
RUN / CUTOFF Positions on the FCS: RUN supplies fuel; CUTOFF shuts it off. The switches on AI171 were moved from RUN to CUTOFF, starving both engines.
FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) An automated system managing engine performance. On AI171, FADEC tried to restart the engines once fuel returned, but the aircraft lacked time and altitude.
RAT (Ram Air Turbine) A small turbine that deploys under the fuselage to generate emergency power if electrical systems fail. On AI171, the RAT was deployed seconds after thrust loss.
EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) Displays engine parameters and warnings. Fuel cut on AI171 would have triggered cascading EICAS alerts.
N2 Measures the high-pressure core speed of a jet engine. On AI171, N2 dropped sharply when fuel was cut.
V1 / Vr V1 is the speed beyond which takeoff can’t be safely aborted; Vr is rotation speed to lift off. AI171 passed these just before fuel was cut.
Spool up / spool down The process of engines accelerating or decelerating. After fuel was restored, AI171’s engines tried to spool up but lacked time to regain thrust.
Pilot Monitoring (PM) / Pilot Flying (PF) The two active cockpit roles during flight. The Pilot Flying (PF) controls the aircraft manually or via autopilot, handling the flight path. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) manages checklists, radios, and systems oversight. While the captain often acts as PF and the first officer as PM, it is equally normal for these roles to be reversed. On AI171, the captain was PM and the first officer was PF—meaning the captain handled systems and communications while the first officer flew the aircraft.
Dual engine failure Loss of thrust on both engines due to external or mechanical causes (like birds or contamination). Initially speculated on AI171, but the report ruled this out—it was a manual fuel shutoff.

 

TIMELINE
Time (UTC) Event What it meant / Commentary
08:07:37 Takeoff roll began on Runway 23 at Ahmedabad. A heavy Boeing 787, full of passengers, fuel, and cargo for a long-haul flight.
08:08:39 Aircraft rotated (Vr) and lifted off at ~155 knots. Climb phase initiated—the most vulnerable time for any aircraft.
08:08:42 Left engine (Engine 1) Fuel Control Switch moved from RUN to CUTOFF. Cut off fuel to left engine; core speed (N2) immediately began to decay.
08:08:43 Right engine (Engine 2) Fuel Control Switch moved from RUN to CUTOFF. Just one second later, fuel cut off to the right engine. Both engines now losing thrust.
08:08:45 – 08:08:50 Engines spooled down. RAT deployed. RAT auto-deployed due to power loss, providing limited hydraulic & electrical backup. Loud bang heard by survivor matched RAT deployment.
08:08:52 Left engine Fuel Control Switch moved back to RUN. After ~10 seconds, attempt to restore fuel to Engine 1. FADEC began relight sequence.
08:08:56 Right engine Fuel Control Switch moved back to RUN. ~13 seconds after it was cut off, fuel returned to Engine 2. Restart attempts commenced.
08:09:05 “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” call transmitted. Indicates crew now fully aware of critical emergency, trying to declare distress.
08:09:11 Cockpit voice recorder stopped. Impact occurred with a building ~1 NM from runway. No further data.
Post-crash Fuel Control Switches found in RUN position. Shows crew attempted recovery—but simply ran out of altitude and time.

 


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